Four Sara Duterte impeachment scenarios
The long Christmas season cross-wires the Filipino psyche. The revelry, intertwined with the traditional financial burden of social obligations, creates a duality of blessedness and frustration. Yet, history shows that as the new year unfolds, political tremors often follow. The First Quarter Storm (1970) preceded martial law; Edsa People Power Revolution (1986) ended Ferdinand Marcos Sr.’s rule; Joseph Estrada’s impeachment (2001) reshaped Philippine politics. Now, in 2025, the impeachment of Vice President Sara Duterte (Feb. 5) signals another crossroads.
If President Marcos wants a swift resolution, he can call a special session of Congress to expedite the Senate trial. But Senate President Chiz Escudero is in no hurry, pushing the trial to June 2—a delay that could shift political calculations. When the trial begins, four possible scenarios emerge:
Scenario 1: Mr. Marcos’ political consolidation. The May 2025 midterm elections could consolidate political forces under Mr. Marcos. The midterms will renew the composition of the Senate, House, and local government units. If pro-Marcos candidates dominate, the Senate may be more inclined to convict Duterte. Historically, election periods trigger a surge in infrastructure projects, social programs, and even illicit vote-buying, injecting money into the economy. A post-election climate of optimism may bolster support for the Marcos administration, making the case against Duterte appear more justified.
However, alternative scenarios challenge this default trajectory.
Scenario 2: The midterms deepen political division. Rather than consolidating power, the elections could fracture the political landscape, complicating governance and impeachment proceedings. If opposition or Duterte-aligned senators win key seats, as is the Duterte gambit in play, Mr. Marcos may struggle to secure the necessary votes for Duterte’s conviction. Congressional gridlock could stall impeachment, preventing a clear resolution and weakening the administration’s ability to legislate effectively. Duterte loyalists could form a power bloc to negotiate leverage, forcing Mr. Marcos to seek compromises rather than eliminating her influence. This scenario suggests a prolonged, inconclusive impeachment trial—one that leaves Duterte politically weakened but still formidable.
Scenario 3: Economic gains fade, public disillusionment rises. While elections inject short-term economic stimulus, the benefits often prove temporary. Once the electoral boost fades, post-election economic challenges could undermine public confidence in Mr. Marcos’ leadership. Persistent inflation and poor government delivery could erode any gains from electoral spending. Economic dissatisfaction could shift public sentiment, making Duterte’s impeachment seem like a political distraction. Declining approval ratings for Mr. Marcos might weaken his ability to push for a conviction, making some senators reconsider their stance on Duterte. This scenario suggests a midterm electoral boost that quickly dissipates, leaving Mr. Marcos politically vulnerable.
Scenario 4: Duterte stages a political comeback. The election may not spell Duterte’s downfall. Instead, she could leverage regional support to rebrand herself as a persecuted political figure. Mindanao, Cebu, and Davao remain Duterte strongholds, where she could rally mass protests and claim that Mr. Marcos is using state institutions for political vendettas. A pro-Duterte faction in Congress could obstruct impeachment efforts, preventing a conviction. Unseen foreign hands could manufacture a political and social media climate supportive of Duterte. If acquitted, Duterte could emerge stronger, portraying herself as a resilient opposition leader, positioning herself for a 2028 presidential run.
Or, Duterte could resign, making the impeachment trial moot and academic, except to bar her from running for public office, which might seem too vindictive to the public. This scenario presents a dangerous gamble for Mr. Marcos—if he overplays his hand, he could unintentionally transform Duterte into a populist underdog.
Thus, while Mr. Marcos may seek to consolidate power through the midterms, alternative scenarios indicate more turbulent trajectories.
But this is all political entertainment. From a larger perspective, this Marcos-Duterte drama is an episode of political titillation that does not constitute the political transformation perennially sought by the people from the iron law of political dynasty, systemic corruption, and faux democracy. It is a battle between two narrow-minded politicians who snatched and squashed the hope of real change. We are thrust into a situation where people seem to be cheering Mr. Marcos against Duterte when in reality it is arguably a choice between two evils.
None of these scenarios give much hope to the people, which makes the lurking scenario of the Filipino wrecking ball “Trump Moment” or another people power revolution likely down the road. Not if, but when.
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