India-China dynamics and PH strategic choices

On Aug. 3 and 4, 2025, Indian and Philippine naval ships sailed together in the South China Sea for the first time. This joint exercise—inside the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone—was more than a tactical drill. It was a statement: that regional powers can cooperate to uphold a rules-based order even in contested waters. Yet the significance of this event lies not only in Manila and New Delhi’s growing partnership, but in the larger strategic context that shapes India’s choices: the enduring complexity of India’s relationship with China.

India-China relations in 2025 are defined by a paradox. They are deeply intertwined economically, yet strategically competitive in ways that shape the security architecture of Asia. Trade between the two nations exceeds $100 billion, but this interdependence masks persistent asymmetries and mistrust. India runs a significant trade deficit, importing Chinese components and intermediate goods while exporting raw materials and select services.

At the same time, the strategic dimension of the relationship is fraught. The Himalayan frontier remains tense after the deadly Galwan Valley clashes of 2020. China’s military modernization and its assertiveness in multiple theaters—whether in the South China Sea or the Himalayas—reflect a consistent pattern of strategic behavior. For India, this means preparing for an adversary capable of projecting power on two fronts: continental and maritime.

China’s posture is rooted in what can only be described as a dual-track strategy. On the one hand, Beijing integrates deeply into global supply chains, using initiatives like the Belt and Road to extend its economic influence. On the other hand, it asserts territorial claims and expands its military footprint in ways that unsettle neighbors. These are not contradictory impulses; they are mutually reinforcing. Economic leverage provides political capital, while military presence underpins the credibility of its ambitions. This approach ensures that even as China promotes trade, it never compromises on its strategic objectives.

Still, economic policy alone is insufficient. India’s strategic calculus involves cultivating partnerships that dilute the risk of overdependence on China and enhance its own influence in the Indo-Pacific. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue remains a cornerstone of this approach, but India has also deepened engagement with Asean and individual Southeast Asian states—hence the significance of the naval drills with the Philippines. For India, these exercises are not a pivot to confrontation; they are part of a broader pattern of strategic diversification, ensuring that no single power dictates the regional order.

The trade dimension offers its own dilemmas. India’s potential reconsideration of membership in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) underscores the tension between market access and domestic protection. Rejoining could open opportunities for integration into regional supply chains, but it also risks exposing vulnerable sectors to Chinese competition.

Narrative management is particularly important. Beijing frames India’s policies as protectionist and its partnerships as containment. Countering this narrative requires India to articulate its actions as transparent, rules-based, and consistent with global norms.

Seen through this lens, the naval exercises with the Philippines acquire added meaning. They are not about creating blocs but about reinforcing the principle that sovereignty and international law matter. They signal that countries like India and the Philippines, while differing in geography and capacity, share an interest in preventing coercion from becoming the default mode of regional politics. The logic is simple: when middle powers collaborate, they expand their strategic choices and reduce the asymmetry of influence.

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India-China relations will likely remain defined by contradiction—economic cooperation intertwined with strategic rivalry. There is no quick resolution, only a constant process of adjustment. But as India calibrates its approach—hedging against overdependence, building indigenous strength, and forging resilient partnerships—the Indo-Pacific gains a measure of stability. For the Philippines, understanding this dynamic is not an academic exercise. It is central to shaping its own strategy in a contested maritime domain.

When Indian and Philippine ships sailed together this August, they did more than stage a joint drill. They sent a message: that even in an age of great-power competition, agency lies not only with the largest states. Strategic autonomy, backed by prudent partnerships, remains possible. For countries navigating the turbulence of Asia’s new order, that is a message worth amplifying.