When the overseer is also the overseen
In public governance, serving as both regulator and provider invites inevitable conflicts. And yet, this is precisely the issue at the heart of the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (Tesda), which functions as the primary oversight agency for Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) while also operating a nationwide network of public training institutions known as Tesda Technology Institutions (TTIs).
This structural overlap, a regulator competing with those it regulates, creates a quiet but serious distortion in our skills development ecosystem. With over 180 public TVIs (or “TTIs”) still under Tesda’s direct management, the agency continues to play dual roles: crafting policy and enforcing standards on one hand, while also providing training services on the other. This undermines regulatory neutrality and raises questions of fairness, efficiency, and accountability.
The 1994 TESDA Act (Republic Act 7796) foresaw a different future. Section 29 of the law mandates the decentralization of training delivery to local government units (LGUs), in line with the broader push for local autonomy. Tesda was meant to evolve into a body focused on strategic oversight and quality assurance, not direct service delivery.
Yet 30 years later, devolution remains partial. From 2004 to 2013, only a handful of TTIs were transferred to LGUs, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), or industry. As of 2025, 183 remain under Tesda’s wing. The agency’s current approach, shaped by its 2022 policy shift, focuses on building LGU capacity without relinquishing operational control of its own training centers. These retained institutions are to be framed as “national models” and are intended to serve as benchmarks for others to emulate.
This may sound prudent, but it also appears suspiciously like institutional protectionism.
When a government agency writes the rules and also competes under them, regulatory objectivity becomes a casualty. TTIs often enjoy better access to scholarships, subsidies, and program support, while private TVET providers, held to the same standards, struggle with fewer resources. This distorts market incentives and undermines the very competition that could drive quality and innovation.
From a governance standpoint, this is not just problematic but also unsustainable. When the overseer is also the overseen, accountability blurs, incentives misalign, and public trust erodes. In such setups, performance indicators, like employment rates or completion data, can be massaged to suit internal narratives. Without independent checks, public institutions risk becoming self-serving silos rather than stewards of public interest.
To be fair, the hesitance toward devolution is not without basis. LGU readiness is uneven. Some municipalities lack the financial bandwidth to absorb TTIs. Others, already running local colleges, may see little benefit in taking on another educational mandate. But this is not an argument against devolution. It is a case for smarter, more adaptive approaches. Selective transfer of TTIs to capable LGUs, institutional amalgamation with nearby state universities and colleges (SUCs), and hybrid governance models are all viable options.
The ultimate goal is not simply to offload Tesda’s institutional burden. It is to design a governance structure in which no single agency holds both regulatory power and service delivery functions. The Commission on Higher Education, for instance, does not operate its own universities, allowing it to maintain relative neutrality in regulating higher education. While CHEd also sits on the boards of SUCs, a position that carries its own risks, it operates within a more consultative and distributed decision-making structure. Tesda, by contrast, holds centralized and direct control over institutions it funds, operates, and evaluates.
It’s time to resolve this contradiction. Tesda must move beyond the comfort of institutional control and fulfill the vision outlined in its founding charter. If decentralization remains a pillar of public sector reform, then the selective devolution of TTIs, whether to LGUs, NGOs, industry, or SUCs, must proceed with urgency, clarity, and support.
Regulators must regulate. Providers must provide. When these lines blur, public policy becomes hostage to institutional interest. And when the overseer is also the overseen, it is the Filipino learner and the national workforce that ultimately pays the price.
Christopher Chua is a professor at Batangas State University. He is an Ateneo Second Congressional Commission on Education research fellow.
