A systems approach to battle corruption

Whenever any conversation shifts to the problem of corruption, we almost always turn to the issue of ethics or morality. We ask: Why are some of our public officials so greedy? Why can’t we find better people to serve in government? Why does corruption persist in the only Catholic country in Asia?

Corruption, persistent and adaptive as we have seen all these years, cannot be explained or solved merely by viewing it as an individual weakness.

Let us, therefore, consider viewing it not merely as a morality issue but also as a “systems problem.” And systems problems require system-wide solutions.

Such a view helps simplify the analysis. Imagine that every corrupt act involves two critical variables : rewards and risks. Rewards are the values or benefits gained—money, influence, contracts, and favors. Risks take the form of detection (being caught), and punishment (being jailed or being penalized monetarily).

Let’s look at the probability (or temptation, if you may) of corruption with these four scenarios:

1. Low risk, low reward corruption—The possibility of detection is low, and the monetary reward is minimal—small time corruption.

2. High risk, low reward corruption—This is a needless risk, because the reward is low. This has no appeal to corrupt officials.

3. Low risk, high reward corruption—This brings double advantages to the potentially corrupt, and is thus a real magnet to some public officials and their conspiratorial private sector partners.

4. High risk, high reward corruption—This is too risky, yet the adventurous may try this with a large dose of audacity.

These four scenarios underscore an inescapable truth: Corruption thrives where rewards are high and the risks are low.

Clearer policy directions. Viewing corruption from this perspective brings in clearer policy implications. Instead of merely preaching ethics or increasing penalties in the abstract, we must identify specific government projects that fit tidily into the low-risk, high-reward category.

Consider the procurement of large infrastructure projects involving enormous sums, or the use (or abuse) of confidential and discretionary funds, customs clearances, etc.—any transaction where a single official exercises broad discretion over high-value decisions with minimal real-time transparency. If records are not publicly accessible, if audits are not done, if whistleblowers lack protection, the system quietly sends “green signals.”

By contrast, imagine a small administrative violation subject to routine audit, digital tracking, and immediate supervisory review. The financial benefit is minimal; the risk of detection is high. This is definitely not worth one’s time or trouble.

Change the reward structure in the system. The lesson presents itself in a simple yet profound way: if we want to reduce corruption, we must change the reward structure built into government systems.

There are two principal levers available. First, increase risk. This does not merely mean harsher penalties on paper. Risk must be real and visible. Transparency mechanisms—public access to procurement data, open budgeting platforms, mandatory asset disclosures, random audits, and protected whistleblower channels—raise the probability that irregularities will be detected.

Second, lower the reward. In some projects, the opportunity for huge rewards can be limited through the systems and structural approach that do the following: Break up large contracts into standardized components, place a cap on discretionary authority, rotate sensitive assignments, and remove monopolistic decision points.

A systems and structural approach also requires prioritization. Governments cannot monitor every minor transaction with equal intensity. The focus must be on identifying those areas where the intersection of low risk and high reward scenario is most acute.

Public engagement plays a crucial role. Civil society organizations, investigative journalists, academic researchers, and citizen watchdog groups expand the “risk” side of the equation. The more eyes on public transactions, the higher the perceived likelihood of exposure.

In governance, as in economics, incentives matter. When we align the structure of incentives with the public interest, integrity ceases to be an act of courage. It becomes a logical choice.

Leadership will. One persistent thought remains. Once this systems approach is installed, plus the needed structure is built-in, policy formulation and implementation must necessarily follow. In a perfect world, this will result in an environment that shall have effectively stamped out corruption.

However, if the leadership sends contrary signals in carrying out this systems approach; and if some policymakers are themselves involved in this practice, and if verdicts and penalties are “negotiable”—then we can say that the “managerial or leadership will” to stamp out corruption is lamentably absent.

In conclusion, the systems approach must be accompanied by a resolute leadership tough against corruption. Without that, the best system will fail to achieve the desired outcome.

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Jose “Ping” de Jesus served as secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways and the Department of Transportation and Communications (now the Department of Transportation).