BARMM’s return to clan politics
The first elected Bangsamoro Parliament held its opening session on Oct. 30. “Now comes the hard part,” President Marcos said in his 11-minute speech. A new coalition, a majority and leaders have been agreed upon, he acknowledged. Members of the new parliament were elected during the much-anticipated but quadruply-postponed first Bangsamoro Parliamentary Elections (BPE). The BPE’s historicity turned out to be and characterized not only of its indistinguishability from previous elections but, more significantly, the return to clan politics.
The new coalition referred to by the President is the new reality that even the political parties of the divided Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP) and Bangsamoro Federalist Party (BFP), recognized as a coalition with old clan-based politicians more than a coalition of rebel-reformers and new breed of politicians. MILF dominance in the seven-year rule of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority has given way to this new reality.
Who actually had a voice in the election? The BPE was marred by election violence, vote-buying and fraud. The Climate Conflict Action’s Critical Events Monitoring System received 476 reports of violence from Sept. 11 to 14, 2026, of which 322 were recorded on election day itself. Election observers flagged concerns regarding the “peacefulness” and high voter turnout. In addition to location-specific security concerns that barred voters from coming to precincts, there were incidences of over-voting, under-voting, command votes, pre-shaded ballots, voter intimidation and, in some municipalities, 99 percent votes for just one candidate.
Nothing prevented political dynasties from dominating the elections. The Bangsamoro Electoral Code prohibits political dynasties (up to second degree of consanguinity) only within a political party but not among district candidates or across political parties. They have the financial resources and organizational capacity for outreach, grand rallies and assemblies, and public visibility to influence the electorate.
Among voters, there was a big gap between the right to vote and the power to actually make a choice. The problem began voter deficits in knowledge of the electoral system and procedures. A 2024 survey commissioned by the Institute for Autonomy and Governance revealed 88.9 percent lack of knowledge about the proportional system of representation, voting procedure for election of district representatives (81.1 percent), and understanding of sectoral assemblies (88.7 percent).
The Commission on Elections, Bangsamoro Electoral Office, and Bangsamoro Information Office conducted voter education programs in cooperation with international development partners, media and civil society organizations prior to the BPE. But effectiveness was constrained by uneven access to information, levels of literacy, linguistic characteristics, amendments to the electoral framework and timetable and changes to the ballot. The 84.34 percent voter turnout during the BPE reflects number of ballots counted but not necessarily voters behind the ballot.
No meaningful change in political governance. The BPE was a competition among elite networks of political dynasties rather than ideology-based political parties. The historical control of political clans in local leadership has transitioned to the regional parliament. The MILF divide reflected in the competition between UBJP and BFP bestowed power to old politicians in the BARMM Grand Coalition and coalition partners in the districts to embed themselves in parliament. Most prominent are members of parliament (MPs) from the Ampatuan, Alonto-Adiong, Sali, Midtimbang, Gandamra, and the Mangudadatu clans. These are the clans that hold name recognition, patronage networks, and financial resources; the same clans that both the UBJP and BFP can no longer live without in governing the region. There are first-time MPs who could infuse new ideas. However, half of them are strongly influenced by old politicians.
What does this mean to the peace process and future of the Bangsamoro? Two strategic agendas are at grave risk: one, completion of the peace project. The peace partners—the central government and MILF—are both struggling for political survival and competing interpretations on the conditionalities for signing the exit agreement. Ordinary people will be caught in the grievances and internal divides of ideology-driven former rebels; and, two, the fundamental aspirations of the Bangsamoro and other peoples of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Meaningful change has to contend with old politics and the uncertainty of the peace project. It can only be brought about by people working at the fringes—people who will find spaces to sustain struggles for restorative justice, land rights, security, and freedom from gun violence.
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Ed Quitoriano and Mcmillan Lucman are advisers of Climate Conflict Action, who work on conflict analysis and resolution, peacebuilding, security, governance, and the underlying political and socioeconomic dynamics shaping conflict in the Bangsamoro region.
