A look at how Tehran could retaliate


Ever since Israel started the war with its surprise bombardment of Iran’s military and nuclear sites on June 13, Iranian officials from the supreme leader on down have warned the United States to stay out, saying it would have dire consequences for the entire region.
With the United States entering Israel’s conflict, it should soon be clear whether these are empty threats or a grim forecast.
Here are the possibilities regarding Iran’s next move.
Targeting Strait of Hormuz
The Strait of Hormuz is the narrow mouth of the Persian Gulf, through which some 20 percent of oil traded globally passes, and at its narrowest point it is just 33 kilometers (21 miles) wide. Any disruption there could send oil prices soaring worldwide and hit American pocketbooks.
Iran boasts a fleet of fast-attack boats and thousands of naval mines that could potentially make the strait impassable, at least for a time.
It could also fire missiles from its long Persian Gulf shore, as its allies, Yemen’s Houthi rebels, have done in the Red Sea.
The United States, with its 5th Fleet stationed in nearby Bahrain, has long pledged to uphold freedom of navigation in the strait and would respond with far superior forces.
But even a relatively brief firefight could paralyze shipping traffic and spook investors, causing oil prices to spike and generating international pressure for a ceasefire.
Attacking US bases, allies
Interviewed by Al Jazeera Mubasher TV, Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, a member of the Houthi movement’s political bureau, noted that its ceasefire deal with Washington last May was before the war on Iran, adding that its response to the US airstrikes was “only a matter of time.”
The United States has tens of thousands of troops stationed in the region, including in permanent bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates—Arab Gulf countries just across the Persian Gulf from Iran and much closer than Israel.
Those bases boast the same kinds of sophisticated air defenses as Israel, but would have much less warning time before waves of missiles or swarms of armed drones.
And even Israel, which is several hundred kilometers away, has been unable to stop all the incoming fire.
Iran could also choose to attack key oil and gas facilities in those countries with the goal of exacting a higher price for US involvement in the war.
A drone attack on two major oil sites in Saudi Arabia in 2019—claimed by the Houthis but widely blamed on Iran—briefly cut the kingdom’s oil production in half.
Activating regional allies
Iran’s so-called Axis of Resistance—a network of militant groups across the Middle East—is a shadow of what it was before the Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel by Hamas. But it still has some formidable capabilities.
Israel’s 20-month war in Gaza has severely diminished the Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad groups. And last fall, Israel mauled Lebanon’s Hezbollah, killing most of its top leadership and devastating much of southern Lebanon—which makes its involvement unlikely.
But Iran could still call on the Houthis, who had threatened to resume their attacks in the Red Sea if the United States entered the war, and allied militias in Iraq. Both have drone and missile capabilities that would allow them to target the United States and its allies.
Iran could also seek to respond through militant attacks further afield, as it is widely accused of doing in the 1990s with an attack on a Jewish community center in Argentina that was blamed on Iran and Hezbollah.
Sprint toward nuclear arms
Experts have long warned that even joint US and Israeli strikes could only delay Iran’s ability to develop a weapon but not eliminate it.
That’s because Iran has dispersed its program across the country to several sites, including hardened, underground facilities.
Iran would likely struggle to repair or reconstitute its nuclear program while Israeli and US warplanes circle overhead.
But it could still decide to fully end its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and abandon the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty—as North Korea did in 2003 before testing a nuclear weapon three years later. —WITH A REPORT FROM REUTERS