A republic treading water
Yesterday, Randy David’s column described the current administration as a “caretaker government,” which it defined as “an interim leadership that exists mainly to keep things in place, maintain stability, and avoid risks that might unsettle the prevailing order.” The column went further and added that, “When this minimalist approach comes to characterize nearly the whole political system, however, we may speak more broadly of caretaker politics”—the title of the column. Administration activity was “largely reduced to system maintenance,” that is, “reassuring markets, stabilizing foreign relations after a period of volatility, lowering political temperature, and letting unresolved conflicts lie.”
At the heart of Randy’s description of President Marcos as being “risk-averse,” a description you often hear from friend and foe alike; though what may turn out to be the defining events of his term were accidental: “In Mr. Marcos’ case, two developments briefly pushed him out of this passive stance: the open rupture with the Dutertes, culminating in the enforcement of the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrant against former President Rodrigo Duterte … and the severe flooding that followed the monsoon rains,” said the column.
You could argue that all our elected administrations since 1992 can be described as caretaker governments, though not for lack of trying in the case of three. First, Fidel V. Ramos, quite early on, identified the shortcomings of the Constitution under which he was elected, but, never having been a politician, he lacked the skills necessary to make a compelling case to the public for his proposal for the revision of the rules. Second, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, too, was only belatedly a politician and, as an instinctive bureaucrat, her attempt to articulate a vision of the state beyond being captive to organized blocs, lacked the personality to convince the electorate of her sincerity. For his part, Benigno S. Aquino III, alone among his predecessors, had paid his political dues, but overestimated the rationality of the electorate, the capacity to believe in rights and reform on the part of the political class, and overestimated the ability of the presidency to impose its will on a bureaucracy either mired in incompetence or captured by his predecessor.
The fifth post-1992 presidency was like the second, in that (just like what we consider our first official presidency, in 1898 to 1901) it was fundamentally ill-equipped to provide the decisiveness, maintain order, and avoid violating both written and unwritten limits on the office, which are the public’s historic expectations of the presidency. Both former Presidents Joseph Estrada and Rodrigo Duterte maintained a myopic fondness for municipal executive behavior, with Duterte motivated, at all costs, to avoid the fate that befell Estrada—to be thrown overboard by the political class in league with the middle class and civil society and the military.
The President today, some observers insist, only shows enthusiasm for his office when on the global stage; perhaps it is where he can be his own man, so to speak, compared to the heavy weight of dynastic expectations in the threefold agenda of his presidency: 1. To achieve political rehabilitation and vindication–absolution through election—by being restored to power and the presidency (check); 2. To settle, once and for all, the many cases haunting the clan and friends, in the courts (check?); 3. To ensure tranquility for the clan and friends through the election of a friendly successor (up in the air).
Nowhere in this ambitious list is what Randy’s column yearns for. It argued that the call of the times is this: “redesigning the budget and procurement systems that normalize corruption.” “When politics limits itself to managing the consequences of corruption rather than dismantling its causes, it abandons its transformative role,” and that the opportunity to attempt this is being missed, because the impeachment complaints filed against the President mark the return of business as usual. The President “has little incentive to disturb the equilibrium that sustains his presidency. Political accommodation once again takes precedence over structural reform.”
Randy is unhappy that “public debate soon narrowed to a familiar script: the pursuit of ’big fish’ and the spectacle of punishment,” when more structural efforts should be made. But the public isn’t wrong; it understands what’s at the heart of his column, actually. It concluded that too many were implicated for this administration to truly clean house, because if made vacant, it might collapse. So what’s the alternative?
He concluded, “The next presidency will inherit not a blank slate but a fully diagnosed festering system failure, a solid basis for a reform agenda.” Notice public attention has shifted to the unusual: discussing what should be done not tomorrow, but in 2028.
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Email: mlquezon3@gmail.com; Twitter: @mlq3
