Allies or all lies? All eyes on Asian allies

The collapse of the US-led alliance in Europe over Ukraine highlights the fragility of US commitment and the comparative brittleness of its alliance system in Asia.

Washington’s pursuit of separate peace talks with Moscow in Riyadh and diplomatic normalization talks in Istanbul has confirmed US abandonment of its treaty and de facto allies in the Ukraine conflict, effectively denying seats for both Europe and Ukraine at the negotiating table. Tokyo, Seoul, Taipei, Manila, Bangkok, and, to a much lesser extent, Jakarta, must acknowledge what US abandonment of its European allies foreshadows for their immediate region.

Apart from the empty rhetoric of Asean centrality, Asian allies will have little to no regional capacity to manage the heightened risks of US abandonment compared to their European counterparts.

Unlike Europe, the US-centered hub-and-spoke system in Asia connects each ally bilaterally to Washington but not multilaterally amongst themselves. This reduces US risks of entrapment at the cost of exposing Asian allies to outsized risks of US abandonment.

In a US-led multilateral alliance system like Europe, abandonment risk has forced allies to look for alternative leadership from within and triggered a collective defense spending ramp to offset the extent of US withdrawal. Among Northeast Asian allies in particular, historical animosities negate most attempts at alternative leadership, and any sudden spike in defense capabilities or forward deployment in a region already armed to the teeth is more likely to increase the likelihood of war than to actually deter it.

For the US-centered hub-and-spoke alliance system in Asia, the systemic consequences are also different. When a peripheral leadership abandons the alliance, a possibility highlighted by former Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte, one out of the many existing bilateral alliances might stop functioning. However, when the central hub leadership abandons its commitment, a risk embodied by Trump, the entire regional alliance infrastructure, including its security guarantees, assurances, and nuclear umbrella extended deterrence, effectively shuts down and evaporates into thin air.

Asian allies will also have limited recourse to and representation in international institutions compared to their European counterparts.

At the UN Security Council, Washington pushed its original version of “Path to Peace,” vetoing British and French attempts at again amending it. The legally binding resolution successfully passed, supported by 10 council member countries with abstentions from all five of its European members.

At the general assembly, Asian allies hold neither a candle nor an incense stick to the 27-member European Union and the 32-member Nato as a collective voting bloc on important international security and defense-related issues. Alliances and regional groupings do not always vote as a coherent whole, and nonbinding resolutions rarely matter.

However, it is also important to remember that Asian ally Taipei’s forfeiting of its veto powers and permanent security council seat to Beijing in 1971 was initially maneuvered through votes on the UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, which later snowballed into Taipei’s subsequent expulsion from all other major international organizations.

Historically, Asian allies have always had limited recourse to Washington throwing them under the bus. The US-drafted 1947 Constitution denied Japan a fully functioning military force. This positions Tokyo as an awkward, irrelevant, and unfit candidate for many roles associated with the UN Security Council which has indirectly, but effectively, blocked its repeated bid for a permanent seat.

Asian allies are also much less likely to succeed in leveraging influence through international economic institutions for their alliance, defense, and security-related purposes. Despite European allies occupying four out of seven seats at the Group of Seven (G7) and being overrepresented at the World Trade Organization (WTO), Washington has objected to and abstained from further collective attempts at including negative references against Russia in any G7 and WTO statements. In addition, Beijing’s growing economic power, financial influence, and strategic positioning in most, if not all, major international institutions serve as an immediate counterbalance against future attempts by Asian allies to push against China’s national interests.

Former Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida’s comment at the 2022 Shangri-La Dialogue that “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow” was ridiculed and attacked by many for being too alarmist. In an abandonment scenario, however, his comment represents wishful thinking because Asian allies are likely to be in a much worse position than Ukraine.

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Pierre Marthinus is executive director for the Marthinus Academy in Jakarta.