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Commonsensical interpretation
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Commonsensical interpretation

Artemio V. Panganiban

I was pleasantly surprised—and a little amused—that my appearance before the Senate last Wednesday as amicus curiae became “trending” and made me something of a viral “rockstar.” I have since been swarmed with hundreds of congratulatory messages, while the media have extensively quoted portions of my presentation on how to compute the votes required for conviction in an impeachment trial.

I AM ALSO HAPPY THAT SO MANY PEOPLE HAVE COMMENTED on the simplicity of my presentation. I merely reminded our senator-judges that, in performing their constitutional duty, they should not be bothered by legalism, legalese, and pointless legalities. In fact, there are only two words they should remember: truth and fairness.

Nonetheless, again at the request of many readers who have not seen and heard me at the Senate, I will sum up my presentation on how, in four points, the Senate impeachment court should interpret our Constitution.

First point, an impeachment trial is sui generis—Latin for “of its own kind”; it is unique because it has legal and political aspects. The trial mimics a traditional courtroom, yet the senator-judges are not magistrates accustomed to the lonely perches of judges and justices. Rather, they are politicians elected by, and freely mixing with, the sovereign people, whose success is catalyzed by popular approval.

Second point, precisely because of this unique nature, how then should the Senate interpret the constitutional mandate that “… No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate?” (Constitution [Article XI, Section 3(6)]).

JURISPRUDENCE TEACHES TWO MAJOR WAYS OF INTERPRETATION: (1) verba legis—defined by the Court in Francisco v. House of Representatives (Nov. 10, 2003, per J Conchita Carpio-Morales, en banc) as “… the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed,” and (2) ratio legis est anima, defined in League of Cities v. Comelec (Dec. 21, 2009, per J Presbitero Velasco, Jr., en banc) as “the reason of the law is the soul of the law.”

Applying verba legis, the plain reading of two-thirds of 24 senators is mathematically 16. In the abstract, mathematics is an exact science. But reality is not always an abstract equation. Illustratively, one small drop of water added to another drop is not always two drops; it may result in one bigger drop of water.

Conversely, ratio legis est anima considers the intent and purpose of the constitutional provisions, the circumstances in which they operate, and the goals they seek to achieve.

Third, which of these two methods should our senator-judges employ? Neither. Because the Senate represents the electorate, it must reflect the common sense of the people, anchored on two fundamental standards: truth and fairness.

Apropos is the wisdom of the late United States Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, who observed that “[t]he very nature of a trial [is] a search for truth.” Thus, the standard of truth is discovered from the facts extracted (1) from studying and verifying the documents submitted; and (2) from hearing the witnesses and observing their demeanor.

On the other hand, the standard of fairness refers to what lawyers call “due process.” It echoes the ancient plea: “Strike me if you must but hear me first.” Therefore, active participation and the independent evaluation of the evidence are essential to the senators’ faithful discharge of this duty.

Fourth, while the Senate exercises its unique constitutional mandate, may it be overturned by the Supreme Court? The answer is a resounding NO, subject to one exception: grave abuse of discretion.

See Also

In Duterte v. House of Representatives (July 25, 2025, per SAJ Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, en banc), the Court defined grave abuse of discretion as the “capricious [or] whimsical [or arbitrary] exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.” In short, the Court will defer to the political wisdom of the Senate, unless the latter acts in a “capricious or whimsical or arbitrary exercise of judgment.”

THIS BRINGS ME TO THE VERY QUIP THAT AMUSED OUR NETIZENS. In my humble view, active participation is the prerequisite for a valid judgment. To set out the oft-quoted line from my speech: “Is it truthful and fair to allow senators to cast their votes despite being absent from the proceedings; in hiding; abroad; legally detained; sick; hospitalized or otherwise absent; and have not been able to access and examine the documents and the testimonies and observe the demeanor of the witnesses?”

Indeed, the Senate’s constitutional duty transcends abstract arithmetic. Neither can it be performed in the shadows of absence nor obscured by legal impediments.

Let the senators therefore vote with their conscience, in full view of the public, guided solely by truth and fairness. As the elected representatives of the Filipino people, their mandate demands a commonsensical interpretation of the Constitution. Only through active, meaningful participation can they render a decision that is fair to the parties, fair to their peers, and ultimately, fair to our sovereign people.

Comments to chiefjusticepanganiban@hotmail.com

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