‘Disorderly behavior’ as shield for impunity
In most parliaments around the world, “disorderly behavior” is a narrow concept. It refers to acts that disturb proceedings—shouting, defying the presiding officer, using offensive language, or staging walkouts. It is not a catchall term for corruption, abuse of power, or violations of criminal law.
In the Philippines, however, the Senate has stretched that term to shield its members from accountability. When the Office of the Ombudsman under Conchita Carpio Morales ordered the dismissal of Sen. Joel Villanueva in 2016 for the misuse of P10 million in Priority Development Assistance Fund, the Senate refused to enforce the order. Its justification: only the Senate may discipline its members for “disorderly behavior” under Article VI Section 16 (3) of the 1987 Constitution. The Senate’s legal counsel even invoked Section 21 of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) to argue that the Ombudsman’s decision had no binding effect on the chamber—a provision that, upon closer inspection, is constitutionally infirm.
This was not an assertion of legislative independence but a misapplication of parliamentary privilege. The Senate redefined disorderly behavior to cover even acts of corruption, thereby insulating itself from a constitutional mechanism of accountability. The irony is stark: the body that should exemplify obedience to law invoked its own rule to evade it.
Under Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman was established as the protector of the people, empowered to investigate and discipline all public officials and employees except those removable only by impeachment. That exception list is short and explicit—the president, vice president, members of the Supreme Court, the constitutional commissions, and the Ombudsman. Members of Congress are not among them. The Constitution thus draws a clear line: while each chamber may punish its members for internal misconduct, crimes such as graft or malversation fall squarely within the Ombudsman’s investigatory and disciplinary jurisdiction.
A violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is not, and can never be, an “internal affair.” It is a criminal act against the state, not a breach of parliamentary decorum. The Senate may censure a member for unruly speech or contempt of its rules, but it cannot, in the name of autonomy, override a lawful dismissal or prosecution for corruption. To do so is to invert Article XI’s command that public office is a public trust.
Yet through Section 21 of RA 6770, Congress quietly rewrote the constitutional design. It declared that the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority does not extend to “Members of Congress.” By passing this clause, legislators effectively exempted themselves from the Ombudsman’s reach—a move that contradicts both the text and spirit of Article XI.
This self-serving exemption came to life in the Villanueva case. The Senate’s refusal to implement the Ombudsman’s dismissal order—citing its supposed exclusive authority to punish “disorderly behavior”—was the direct result of RA 6770’s constitutional defect. In doing so, the Senate conflated two very different concepts: internal discipline and public accountability. The Supreme Court has long clarified in Sanchez v. Ombudsman (1996) and Pimentel v. Aguirre (2000) that autonomy and separation of powers do not shield legislators from investigation or prosecution under general law. The Ombudsman’s reach extends to all public officials, regardless of branch.
In the United States, whose constitutional framework closely mirrors ours, each chamber of Congress also has the power to punish members for disorderly behavior and to expel them with a two-thirds vote. Yet this authority has always been confined to parliamentary misconduct—breaches of decorum, abuse of privilege, or conflicts of interest—not to corruption or criminal acts.
By contrast, the Philippine Senate’s invocation of “disorderly behavior” to defy a lawful dismissal order from the Ombudsman has no parallel in the US system. This distortion is not harmless. If the Senate can simply reinterpret “disorderly behavior” to shield its members from dismissal, and if RA 6770’s exemption remains unchallenged, the Ombudsman’s constitutional mandate is hollow. The legislature, in effect, becomes the judge of its own corruption—a mockery of the principle that no one should be above the law.
The Constitution never intended that. The Ombudsman was created as a check on all branches, independent of political influence. Congress cannot amend that by stealth. The Supreme Court, should it be called upon, must confront this constitutional defect directly: the exemption of members of Congress in RA 6770 is void for being repugnant to Article XI.
Until that infirmity is struck down, “disorderly behavior” will remain what the Senate has turned it into—a shield for the disorder of impunity.
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Raul F. Borjal is an alumnus of both Ateneo de Naga University and Ateneo de Manila University. He is a cofounder and a member of the editorial board of Dateline Ibalon, an online magazine.
