Don’t scrap the party list—take it back
The 1987 Constitution created the party list system to fix a basic unfairness in Philippine politics: if you’re poor, landless, or outside powerful families, getting into Congress is nearly impossible.
Up to 20 percent of House seats—currently 63 of 316—are reserved for party list groups, giving workers, farmers, urban poor, women, indigenous peoples, and other marginalized sectors a real voice in lawmaking. The early years after the first election in 1998 showed real promise: until 2007, groups like Gabriela, Anakpawis, and Bayan Muna secured 10 to 15 percent of House seats and authored over 200 bills advancing labor rights, agrarian reform, gender protection, and human rights.
These representatives transformed congressional debates—labor advocates highlighted workplace safety, contractualization, and minimum wages that elite discussions long ignored, directly fueling the 2001 Magna Carta for Women and anti-endo or end of contract measures; peasant leaders revived land distribution and rural poverty issues, fostering reforms that redistributed over 4 million hectares by 2014; women’s organizations championed antiviolence against women and children laws, helping cut reported domestic violence cases by 12 percent afterward; and human rights defenders enhanced oversight through investigations into politically sensitive abuses like post-2001 extrajudicial killings. They never dominated Congress but fundamentally shifted what it talked about—polls showed 68 percent public approval for party lists in 2004.
For the first time, ordinary Filipinos saw lawmakers rooted in lived experience rather than belonging to dynasties or political machine. Before 2010, just 15 percent of party list representatives had dynasty ties, compared to 70 percent in districts.
So why is it broken now?
The party list system was never intended as an ancillary platform for traditional politicians or fat wallets. Yet that purpose was eroded over time.
Elite capture struck first, as lax enforcement blurred the “marginalized and underrepresented” rule. By 2022, 41 percent of party list groups were linked to dynasties or ex-officials, up from just 5 percent in 2001. Based on Commission on Elections data, total party list election spending likely runs into the billions of pesos per election cycle.
Dilution followed. Long-term data analyzed by political scientist Dr. Rogelio A. Panao tracking party list advocacies from 2007 to 2022 show a clear shift away from core marginalized sectors. Groups representing farmers, labor, indigenous peoples, women, fisherfolk, and the informal sector stagnated or declined, while multisectoral and regional parties surged. Per the study, multisectoral parties increased from six to 31 and regional parties grew from seven to 20 during the period. This reflects not isolated abuse but structural drift: the system increasingly rewards organizational reach rather than marginalization.
Accountability collapsed, too—voters rarely know nominees preelection, postvote substitutions hit 25 percent in 2019, party list representatives averaged just 1.2 sector-specific bills per term versus 5.8 for districts, yet 60 percent won reelection amid 54 percent public distrust.
No wonder 47 percent favored scrapping party lists in 2025 polls. But that could further strengthen dynasties that already control 80 percent of Congress through cash machines and heirloom seats. As argued in my previous article, political dynasties don’t just win—they inherit. (see “Enabling the antidynasty mandate,” 12/27/25)
Running in districts requires P10 million to P50 million and machinery that grassroots leaders like farmers, workers, and urban poor can’t match. Without party lists, clans notorious for blocking antidynasty bills would slam shut this entry door. Early party lists had boosted marginalized legislation by 30 percent before elite capture.
The remedy demands deep reform, echoing antidynasty calls for independent checks.
Tighten eligibility with evidence like poverty data for households under P12,000 monthly or landless stats—not mere slogans—and bar groups tied to dynasties, big corporations with over P100 million in assets, or ex-top officials, verified by the Commission on Elections with civil society oversight.
Require nominees to hail from their sectors with five-plus years documented service like NGO leadership or union records, mandate preelection disclosure, and cap substitutions under 5 percent with Supreme Court oversight.
Enforce performance and accountability through biennial reviews requiring minimum three sector bills per term, 10-plus committee hearings, and gains like 10-percent sector income uplift—failures lose accreditation, modeled on New Zealand’s 5-percent threshold.
The system didn’t fail because inclusion was flawed. It failed when abusers hijacked this constitutional provision for exclusion.
To build a Congress that truly includes marginalized Filipinos, we must not scrap the party list system—we must take it back.
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Pete Maniego is an engineer, lawyer, economist, and past chair of the National Renewable Energy Board, Institute of Corporate Directors, University of the Philippines Engineering Research & Development Foundation, and Energy Lawyers Association of the Philippines
