Dynasties still dominate Southeast Asian politics

Dynasties are central to Southeast Asian politics as parties are weak, patronage is entrenched, and family names are the most durable political brands. But they also face persistent difficulties. Heirs inherit office without real authority, patriarchs refuse to step aside, and rivals, whether other families or powerful institutions, intervene.

With two prominent political families locked in a bitter feud in the Philippines, the Shinawatra clan currently being sidelined in Thailand, and the Hun family navigating an uncertain succession in Cambodia, now is the right moment to take stock of how dynastic politics operates throughout Southeast Asia.

The Philippines offers perhaps the starkest example of dynastic democracy in Southeast Asia. Philippine politics remains structured less by parties or programs than by family blocs, with the Marcos and Duterte clans foremost among them. Coalitions rest on name recognition and patronage networks that have proved more durable than any formal party institution.

The Philippine system remains fiercely competitive. But dynastic politics there narrows true democratic representation and weakens accountability. It also leaves coalitions prone to fracture. The alliance between the Marcos and Duterte families that swept the 2022 elections, for example, cracked almost immediately.

The current Philippine Vice President, Sara Duterte, is now in open conflict with President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the son and namesake of the former Philippine dictator who was ousted in 1986. This rupture has unsettled the government.

Sara Duterte has faced impeachment efforts, which have been blocked by a Supreme Court shaped by the appointees of her father, Rodrigo Duterte, who was president between 2016 and 2022. At the same time, she is positioning herself as a leading contender for the 2028 presidency.

Indonesia’s newer democracy tells another, albeit relatively similar, story. Since democratization in 1998, decentralization and local elections have opened routes from local to national office. Families have used party nominations, money, media, and entrenched networks to turn those routes into political power. Dynastic maneuvering now sits at the center of national and local Indonesian politics.

Gibran Rakabuming Raka, the son of former President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, reached vice presidency in 2024 after a controversial constitutional court ruling reduced the age requirement for candidacy. The chief justice at the time was Widodo’s brother-in-law, Anwar Usman.

Public unease with hereditary politics in Indonesia has been visible on the streets. Protests in 2024 and wider demonstrations in 2025 have taken place over lawmakers’ perks, cost-of-living pressures, and police violence. Much of this anger reflects the trajectory of post-Suharto Indonesia.

Thailand and Cambodia show how dynasties function under less democratic conditions. In Thailand, parties aligned with the Shinawatra family have played a major role in the country’s politics since 2001. Yet governments linked to the family have been routinely constrained or overturned by Thailand’s conservative royalist-military establishment.

Cambodia illustrates a different dynamic. Prime minister for decades, Hun Sen built a durable coalition of political, economic, and security elites, sustained by the brutal suppression of dissent and generous rewards for loyalists. Now the aging patriarch is attempting to secure his family’s dominance into the next generation.

The reemergence of Hun Sen as Cambodia’s decisive political voice during the recent border conflict with Thailand, for example, raises doubts about his son Hun Manet’s readiness for the top job.

Dynasties endure in Southeast Asia because they thrive in environments where institutions are weak, parties are underdeveloped, and patronage is the main currency of politics. Family names provide continuity that other political structures often cannot.

But dynasties also struggle. Heirs may lack the authority, charisma, or networks of their predecessors. Older patriarchs and matriarchs often remain active, limiting renewal. And rival families compete fiercely for power, which can fragment coalitions and unsettle governments.

In the Philippines and Indonesia, two electoral democracies, politics is shaped by bargains among dominant families. This raises doubts about the depth of democratic competition. In Thailand and Cambodia, politics is more tightly controlled. Dynasties there expose the fragility of succession and the limits imposed by entrenched power centers.

Across Southeast Asia, dynasties still shape how power is acquired and passed on. But they do not resolve the uncertainties of rule. The only constant seems to be that authority remains concentrated among elites and shifts only within their ranks. The Jakarta Post/Asia News Network

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Neil Loughlin is a lecturer in comparative politics at City St George’s, University of London.

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The Philippine Daily Inquirer is a member of the Asia News Network, an alliance of 22 media titles in the region.