Good and bad cops

It seems to me that having a secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and a secretary of the Department of National Defense (DND) seemingly operating at cross-purposes is something new. In the past, the defense department was focused on fighting insurgency, with little to no regard for matters beyond our shores. This began to change under the still-unrecognized transformative leadership of Avelino Cruz Jr., who, to my mind, began the professionalization of the armed forces, which finally ended the adventurism that plagued the military since the late Marcos Sr. era. The foreign affairs department, for its part, is constrained by the chief executive’s policy and directives: it cannot go beyond the comfort level of whoever is the incumbent president at the time.

The cooperation of the two departments, each representing institutions with the most deeply entrenched professionalism in the government (aside from the Central Bank, which is independent), was most notable during the Duterte administration, quietly but firmly, keeping the country from going off the deep end as then President Rodrigo Duterte zigged and zagged in what passed for his foreign and domestic policy, which was simply survival, intimidation, and maximizing the perks in between. While outside observers tried to garnish the hot mess that was his presidency with attributes of “policy” or “strategy,” there was little rhyme or reason from those perspectives: it was simply the cunning of a provincial baron (even the actual administration of the nation was delegated to aides such as the real acting president, Bong Go, who won his showdown over the direction and purpose of the administration with his chief rival, Jun Evasco). The professionalism of the DFA and DND (to be precise: our officer corps, in fact) kept things on a relatively even keel, preserving the alliances that mattered and tempering the temporary enthusiasms of the incumbent (a case in point: the so-called “pivot to China” could never overcome Chinese skepticism about Filipino constancy or the lack of it, because when push came to shove with regard to Pogos, for example, the interlocking dependencies of big swathes of the upper and middle classes benefiting from Pogo rental income, and local and national officials in the pockets of the Pogos meant Manila only ever paid lip service to Beijing’s demands for it to crack down in support of the Chinese government’s crackdown).

The tenure of Cruz in the DND suggests something basic but overlooked: the military establishment is best run by a civilian, because civilians are better equipped to have a broad strategic and administrative vision that transcends the parochial interests of the military. Here, President Marcos took some time to get his bearings, after the aggressive attempt by Vice President Sara Duterte to claim the defense portfolio as her share of the spoils after winning the election. Jose Faustino Jr. and Carlito Galvez Jr. were not only officers in charge; they were ex-generals, who may have been useful in ensuring the stability of the armed forces (meaning their being free of divided loyalties). But it took Gilberto Teodoro Jr. to make his mark.

To his credit, the President from the start preferred to entrust the DFA to a career official, but Enrique Manalo may have proven too bland a career diplomat for the job. It is also to his credit that he stuck to our corps of career diplomats for his next choice, Tess Lazaro, who has managed the job with aplomb. However, most observers fail to consider that foreign policy is thoroughly and exclusively the prerogative of whoever happens to be president; and presidents can have the best people, but their usefulness is entirely dependent on the president’s ability or willingness to use these people. Consider the fact that we have had two truly excellent ambassadors to China: the late Chito Sta. Romana and the incumbent, Jaime FlorCruz, individuals with a deep understanding and knowledge of the Chinese way of thinking and acting, the government, and its officials. Yet Sta. Romana was (aside from one brief occasion, if memory serves) never consulted by President Duterte; one wonders if the treatment of FlorCruz is any different. And in both cases, heated comments from Manila completely ignore whether or not the fire-breathing behavior some seem to expect of our ambassadors is either wise or necessary.

Are Teodoro and Lazaro playing bad cop and good cop, respectively? It wouldn’t be surprising if this were so, but one also can’t avoid wondering if the usual problem that plagues every administration—everyone thinks they’re a communications expert and no one feels bound by what any other official says—is afflicting this one. Judging from the President’s own statements, which are, on the whole, conciliatory except when provoked, at which point he holds firmly to established Philippine positions, neither secretary is widely off the mark when it comes to their principal, the chief executive. The DND and the military—and, to a certain extent, the coast guard, which is civilian—can be more combative while the DFA holds the line without straying past accepted diplomatic conventions, including privately but sharply calling the Chinese ambassador to task.

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