How to contain dynasties

In the Philippines, politics is a family business. The numbers are staggering. Political dynasties hold more than 65 percent of all public elective positions, according to the Philippine Institute for Development Studies. Last week, I wrote that dynastic nuances would endure (see “Why dynasties endure,” 12/8/25), but still I submit that dynasties can be contained through (1) constitutional clarity, (2) targeted legislation, and (3) strategic nudges.

ON CONSTITUTIONAL CLARITY, there have been calls for a constitutional convention (Con-con) to propose amendments, revisions, corrections, and changes to the 1987 Constitution. Unlike a Constituent Assembly, in which Congress itself convenes to propose changes to the Constitution, a Con-con involves the election of new delegates per legislative area or region to form an independent convention.

While theoretically this may help clarify ambiguities and address deficiencies in our Constitution, there remain questions of delegate qualifications and of preventing dynasties from dominating the Con-con membership. Absent these mechanisms, preventing dynasties from controlling the convention could lead to a quack Con-con run by the very elites that the current antidynasty provision seeks to restrain.

ON ANTIDYNASTY LEGISLATION, Senate Bill No. 1548 seeks to prohibit any person related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity (up to cousins and their spouses) to an incumbent national or local elective official from running for national office, for local office within the same jurisdiction, or under the party-list system. It also prohibits immediate successors from being elected to the same office. If enacted, it would widen access to public office for qualified candidates outside dynastic networks.

Many politicians publicly express opposition to dynasties, yet passage of the bill remains elusive. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution— mandating an antidynasty law—remains one of the constitutional provisions that Congress has failed to implement. Like Con-con proposals, this bill may share the fate of many stalled and pending measures.

ON THE NUDGE FROM COEQUAL BRANCHES, President Marcos recently urged Congress to “prioritize” four bills: antidynasty, party-list system reform, the Independent People’s Commission that would create a permanent body to investigate infrastructure corruption, and the Citizen Access and Disclosure of Expenditures for National Accountability that would institutionalize transparency through a digital budget portal. These are pragmatic paths toward reform, building checks and balances around political dynasties and compelling them to operate within a framework of accountability rather than impunity.

Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has received many petitions to compel Congress to pass an antidynasty law. Under the Rules of Court, a writ of mandamus may be issued to compel obedience only to ministerial, not discretionary acts. Jurisprudence defines a ministerial duty as “a simple, definite duty … a precise act accurately marked out.” Thus, “if the law imposes a duty but gives the officer [upon whom it is imposed] the right to decide how or when it shall be performed, the duty is discretionary, not ministerial.”

Under this test, a traditional, verba legis Court may direct Congress to pass an enabling law but will not determine what the law should contain. However, an activist Court, like the one I led, would engage in judicial nudging and articulate a baseline definition grounded on the first degree of consanguinity or affinity (parents, children, spouses). Who, indeed, can deny their dynastic relations? Congress may expand it later, but such jurisprudential guidance would at least provide a starting point.

WHEN DYNASTIES FALL, WHO RISES? Even when one clan loses, another often replaces it. In 2016, the Apostols of Leyte were unseated by the Ongs, themselves an emerging dynasty. In Pasig, Mayor Vico Sotto defeated the Eusebios in 2019, yet he himself comes from the influential Sotto clan. With his reputation for good governance, would the Pasigueños vote for Vico’s future spouse and children—should they decide to enter politics? Dynasties, after all, could provide continuity and stability.

These examples reveal an uncomfortable truth: the problem is not just dynasty per se, but also impunity. This is why I submit that accountability, not just transparency, must be our priority. Transparency flags illegal acts and democratizes information. However, without enforcement, it is merely performative. The flood control scams prove this: names were identified and guilt established, but will the most implicated officials spend Christmas outside jail, untouched by consequences?

We have become adept at exposing corruption, but woefully inept at punishing it. Only when corrupt officials—dynasty members or otherwise—face swift, certain, and meaningful consequences will transparency translate into genuine accountability and systemic change. Until then, any antidynasty measure, no matter how well-crafted, will remain a paper tiger.

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