Legislative overreach of contempt powers
The political theater is playing to standing room only, even to a virtual public gallery with the storied escapades of what that Al Jazeera documentary had reported was a Chinese spy. The supporting actors are no less controversial: a former legislator and a presidential spokesperson.
Prominent in the political zarzuela is the power of legislative contempt that may be exercised for causes as mundane as when the legislator is piqued by a witness’ answer, to a strategic invocation of constitutional rights to privacy or against self-incrimination.
Legislative contempt powers are quite broad enough and can be exercised for almost any reason, including hubris and vainglory.
In the Balag v. Senate case (2018,) the Supreme Court re-affirmed legislative contempt as an inherent power of Congress. The inherent power of contempt during inquiries in aid of legislation, however, should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry under which said power is invoked. There is also the statutory legislative contempt under Article 150 of the Revised Penal Code that could serve to punish a recalcitrant witness in a legislative inquiry even beyond its termination. But this will require a formal charge in court, where the rights of the accused-witness will be amply protected.
In the exercise of inherent legislative contempt, constitutional rights are blurry because the recalcitrant witness can go directly to jail without hearing and without being afforded a right to bail.
While Congress has inherent contempt powers that could send a recalcitrant witness to jail, there are no legislative detention facilities. Thus, the recalcitrant witness is committed either in the city jails of Pasay City or Quezon City, the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa, or the Correctional Institute for Women in Mandaluyong City.
Here lies the legislative overreach which breaches the Constitution. In committing detainees to these facilities, which are under the control and supervision of the executive department, Congress transgresses the constitutional guarantee of separation of powers. The city jails are under the control and supervision of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), while the national prisons in Muntinlupa and Mandaluyong City are under the control and supervision of the Bureau of Corrections (BuCor).
When either legislative chamber directs any warden of these detention facilities to safekeep a recalcitrant witness, such directive subjugates a subordinate of the president, indirectly subjugating the Chief Executive. Congress cannot impose a duty upon the President which is not mandated by the Constitution.
Under R.A. 10575, the BuCor is in charge of safekeeping and instituting reformation programs for national inmates sentenced to more than three years. Under R.A. No. 6975, the BJMP has supervision and control over all city jails for the custody and safekeeping of city prisoners, any fugitive from justice, or persons detained awaiting investigation or trial, among others.
In Marquez v. COMELEC (1993), a “fugitive from justice” is defined to include not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. Recalcitrant legislative witnesses evading legislative summon or arrest are not considered fugitives from justice. Their detention in a city jail or national prison violates the Constitution and may be vulnerable to a habeas corpus petition.
A legislative warrant of arrest is a political process which cannot be implemented in the international sphere. The Interior Secretary was thus right to implement with international cooperation a judicial arrest warrant abroad, and deliver the arrested person to the court which issued it.
