Marcos Jr. in the shadow of Marcos Sr.

The rapid succession of events—the swift impeachment of Vice President Sara Duterte by the House of Representatives in February and the arrest and transfer of former president Rodrigo Duterte to the International Criminal Court (ICC last week)—has led to a reassessment of President Marcos’ political acumen and decisiveness.

Many had previously viewed Mr. Marcos as conflict-averse, reluctant to confront the Duterte faction directly, and lacking the ruthless strategic precision of his father, Ferdinand Marcos Sr. However, the recent turn of events suggests a more calculated, premeditated move to consolidate power, leading to the question: Is Mr. Marcos proving to be as strategically adept as his father, despite earlier perceptions?

The House’s rapid impeachment of Sara Duterte signaled that Mr. Marcos had already secured the legislative numbers and political will to move against the Dutertes. Sandro Marcos as the first signer and Martin Romualdez as the last signer of the impeachment charge was a mischievous wink. Duterte’s ICC arrest followed shortly after, strongly suggesting patient entrapment rather than coincidence.

What we are realizing now is Marcos’ occult strategy of gradually isolating the Dutertes. Instead of engaging in a direct, early confrontation, Mr. Marcos systematically weakened the Duterte faction by withholding outright support for Sara Duterte’s political moves (e.g., withholding the defense portfolio, wresting control of the House speakership). Allowing internal fragmentation within the Duterte coalition and, finally, delivering decisive blows when the moment was right—ensuring Sara Duterte’s impeachment and letting Rodrigo Duterte face international accountability.

These moves show greater political decisiveness than previously assumed, but some distinctions remain between Mr. Marcos and his father. As to political style, Marcos Sr. used direct authoritarian control and strong-handed rule, backed by the military and police, while Mr. Marcos prefers subtle, indirect, and less overtly authoritarian tactics. As to the use of institutions, Marcos Sr. weaponized government machinery early in his rule (e.g., martial law) while Mr. Marcos uses existing institutions (Congress, ICC, law enforcement) to weaken enemies without directly appearing oppressive. As for the management of political rivals, Marcos Sr. co-opted, crushed, or exiled opponents (e.g., Ninoy Aquino) while Mr. Marcos isolates and undermines opponents while keeping a façade of the democratic process.

Mr. Marcos’ reluctance to move swiftly against the Dutertes earlier might have been due to the fear of losing the Duterte base before the 2025 elections. Many Duterte loyalists remain a powerful force in Philippine politics. By delaying confrontation, Mr. Marcos ensured the Duterte faction was already fragmented before he acted.

Instead of challenging the Dutertes when they were still strong, Mr. Marcos let their influence erode naturally through the quad comm investigation process that saw Sara Duterte flustered and struggling in approval ratings. Meanwhile, the ICC scrutiny goaded Rodrigo Duterte, in his inimitable macho bravado, to make damaging self-incriminating statements.

By framing Duterte’s arrest as an Interpol matter, Marcos avoided taking full responsibility for Duterte’s downfall. The dual blows against the Duterte faction—Sara’s impeachment and Rodrigo’s arrest—suggest that Mr. Marcos is now in a stronger position than ever before. The 2025 midterm elections will now be fought under a Marcos-dominated landscape. The Duterte bloc, once a threat, is now fragmented, discredited, and leaderless. Mr. Marcos now controls the narrative, having strategically removed a major political rival, maintaining deniability that he has declared outright war against the Dutertes or that he has surrendered Philippine sovereignty.

While Mr. Marcos does not rule with the same iron grip as his father, his ability to strategically weaken the Dutertes without direct confrontation reflects a deep political instinct that many had underestimated. Whether he continues to consolidate power effectively or faces a backlash will depend on how well he manages the post-Duterte political landscape.

Marcos Sr. got his political opponents arrested on Sept. 23, 1972, a full two days after secretly declaring martial law, the better to surprise his political enemies. In the case of Mr. Marcos, he managed to fool the Dutertes into believing he would not cooperate with the ICC, the better to get Duterte into his political parlor, get him arrested, and whisked straight to detention in The Hague, in just 37 hours. Mr. Marcos is proving to be a cunning and patient strategist—one who plays the long game and wins. The tell-tale similarity is in the checkmate modus operandi.