Reaching common ground on the Iran war

However polarized Americans appear about the Iran war, a consensus has formed on critical issues. Many commend while others condemn the war; few grieve the elimination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the top leaders of Iran’s Islamist government established in 1979. Most believe that the world is a safer place with the weakening of a regime that conducts, directly and through proxies, terrorist attacks across the Middle East, periodically kills its own citizens to suppress dissent—recording in January an estimated 30,000 to 45,000 victims—and seeks greater power by acquiring nuclear weapons.

Pro- and anti-Trump groups also agree that the decision to fight the war was United States President Donald Trump’s choice. Supporters deride his predecessors for kicking the can down the road and praise Trump for taking decisive action to avert the “imminent threat” posed by a nuclear-armed Iran. Anti-Trumpers question the “imminence” of the threat. The administration had trumpeted in June 2025 that Operation Midnight Thunder had “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear facilities. It maintains, even now, that it can easily detect and stop any attempt to process into weapons whatever enriched uranium Iran had concealed or may recover in the debris left by Midnight Thunder and the current Operation Epic Fury.

Third, regardless of attitudes about the war, everyone celebrates the American armed forces for delivering on their operational and military objectives. On March 6, less than a week into the war, Trump confidently demanded Iran’s “unconditional surrender,” and on March 11, declared victory. He claimed that US and Israeli bombs had largely destroyed Iranian air and naval forces so that the US had “practically nothing left to target.” Initial pronouncements that Iran had lost the power to defend against American air attacks or to inflict damage on American allies in the Gulf proved premature. From the outset, however, US superiority in training, skills, weaponry, and resources for an aerial campaign was never in dispute.

Yet, some three weeks later, Trump reported the war as “on track,” “ahead of schedule,” and ending “soon.” These assurances did not bring comfort. Gas prices went up, and markets dropped. What the public heard was the caveat in the national address: “soon” meant two, possibly three weeks of intensified violence to complete “core strategic objectives.” But Trump had never provided a credible, coherent, and consistent rationale for the war’s strategic goals and their metrics. Meanwhile, the Strait of Hormuz blockade and attacks on the infrastructure of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states had complicated strategic and geopolitical planning.

Trump thus had to preserve a window for additional operations, possibly including “boots on the ground,” for which some units had already been prepositioned. These possibilities run counter to shared public sentiments on two additional issues: the opposition to “forever wars” and to the deployment of American ground forces to fight them. The rescue missions to recover two crew members, whose plane was shot down by Iranian ground fire, demonstrated American capabilities. It also warned against the risks of an extended war on Iranian soil.

An alternative to a ground war was Trump’s threat to bomb Iran “back to the Stone Age.” The US has the power to attempt this. The destruction of a bridge still not in full use, and academic research institutions provided samples of this plan. It could also include the bombing of critical civilian infrastructure, such as energy grids and desalination plants, raising legal and moral issues that the American public will need to address. Will it allow the Trump administration to commit potential war crimes in its name?

Trump’s war of choice has depleted the stock and sources of energy needed to power the global economy. It has also damaged the infrastructure for continued, stable production and disrupted supply chains for their worldwide delivery. The end of the war will not immediately resolve these problems, even after gas and oil supply levels normalize. But it is now increasingly recognized as the first step toward rebuilding and recovery. Some countries have successfully pursued diplomatic negotiations to arrange passage of supplies through Hormuz, an option limited by the ongoing war. How will bombing Iran back to the Stone Age help the world and the American public?

Americans show a growing consensus and concern about the course of the war and its consequences for them. But the war is likely to drag on until they reach a stronger agreement on two critical issues: How long will they accept the costs and the pain they are enduring from the war? What extreme measures will they allow their leaders to take to compel Iranian surrender?