Resolve the impeachment vote threshold within constitutional bounds
The ongoing discussion on the impeachment trial of Vice President Sara Duterte has raised a fundamental constitutional question: What is the proper threshold for conviction, and who gets to decide it? This is not a partisan issue. It is about the rule of law.
Private prosecutor Amando Virgil Ligutan correctly pointed out that the Constitution does not explicitly fix “16 votes” as the threshold, but Article XI, Section 3(6) states that conviction requires “the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.” With 24 senators, that is 16 votes.
The prosecution panel’s proposal to lower the threshold due to absences and detentions is understandable in light of practical difficulties. However, changing a constitutional denominator because of circumstance sets a dangerous precedent. The law must not bend to convenience.
Ligutan also warned that bringing this dispute to the Supreme Court could create a constitutional dilemma. While the Constitution does not expressly bar judicial review of Senate impeachment decisions, the doctrine of separation of powers implies that the Senate’s power to “try and decide” impeachment cases is exclusive.
Yet, he is also right that only the Supreme Court can ultimately determine whether the threshold issue is a political question or a justiciable matter. This tension is precisely why we must be careful. To invite the Court is to risk encroachment. To not invite it is to risk constitutional ambiguity.
This debate mirrors a basic principle I learned in local legislation: a body cannot act without a quorum. Under Article VI, Section 16(2) of the Constitution, “a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business.” Quorum is not a formality. It is a jurisdictional requirement.
The key question is: who counts in that majority? In parliamentary practice, we distinguish between “elected and qualified” members and those legally incapacitated. Those who have not taken the oath, have resigned, died, or been removed are excluded from the denominator.
A practical example from the Sanggunian: If a council has 11 members but six are preventively suspended by the Ombudsman, the denominator becomes five. The quorum then is three. If three are present and two vote yes, the action is valid. The law adjusts to the number of members actually qualified to act.
The same logic must apply with care to the Senate. If we start subtracting senator-judges due to absence or detention without a clear constitutional basis, we alter “all the Members of the Senate.” The Constitution says “all,” not “all those present.” That word matters.
Philosophically, this touches on social contract theory. We, the people, delegated specific powers to specific institutions with specific rules. To change the rules mid-process because it is difficult is to break that contract. John Locke warned that when the government acts outside its delegated authority, it loses legitimacy.
The June 3 Senate session controversy was a reminder that procedure protects democracy. When we ignore quorum, or reinterpret “two-thirds” to mean something other than what the text says, we weaken the very shield that guards us against arbitrary rule.
I join the many Filipinos here and abroad urging the Senate, the prosecution, and the defense to resolve this within constitutional bounds. If clarification is needed, let it come through a careful Supreme Court ruling, not through ad hoc adjustments. Our institutions must be bigger than any single trial. For when the quorum fails, or when we rewrite the threshold, the rule of law follows closely behind.
REGINALD B. TAMAYO,
Marikina City
