SC balances protection of journos, public

For years, the prescriptive period for cyberlibel has befuddled magistrates, legislators, lawyers, journalists, and the public. In Tolentino v. People (Aug. 6, 2018, per J later CJ Teresita Leonardo-de Castro), the Court’s First Division, through an unsigned extended resolution, held that the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 or Cybercrime Law—in relation to Art. 90, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)—“prescribes in fifteen [15] years.” On this basis, the cyberlibel allegedly committed by the accused Wilbert Tolentino had not prescribed.

FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER, THE COURT CHANGED ITS MIND. Causing v. People (Oct. 11, 2023, per J Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, Third Division), applied par. 4 of the same Article 90 of the RPC and held that the “crime of libel … shall prescribe in one year.” The Third Division reasoned that cyberlibel and traditional libel are “one and the same crime” since their elements are the same; ergo, their prescriptive periods should also be the same, i.e., one year.

Ironically, though the accused won the battle to fix the prescriptive period to one year, he lost the war because the date of the discovery of the allegedly libelous article was not established.

In my Jan. 29, 2024 column (“Will Maria Ressa, Jinggoy Estrada be acquitted?”), I observed that this conflict between the First and Third Divisions should be settled by the full Court, because under the Constitution (Article VIII, Section 4, Item 3) only the Court en banc may modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law.

Fortunately, the separate partial motions for reconsideration filed by the accused and the prosecution in Causing v. People were referred to and later resolved by the Court en banc via a resolution promulgated on April 8, 2026. It held that cyberlibel prescribes in one year from the “date of the discovery of the alleged defamatory [online] remarks,” not from their publication.

Penned also by J Inting, the resolution—passed by a hairline 8-7 vote—clarified that the Tolentino ruling is not a doctrinal or a binding precedent since it was contained in an unsigned extended resolution, not in a signed ponencia.

Notably, the seven dissenters led by J Antonio T. Kho Jr. argued that traditional libel and cyberlibel are not the same because of the presence of “the qualifying aggravating circumstance of [the] use of ICT;” thus, “the one-year prescriptive period is no longer controlling, as it is only applicable in traditional libel.”

All told, I regret I do not have the space to quote the other justices. Suffice it to say that the matter is now settled: The State’s authority to prosecute, and the power of courts to penalize, cyberlibel prescribes in one year, reckoned from the discovery by the offended parties or the authorities of the allegedly defamatory article, not from its publication. Needless to say, the date of discovery must be proven during the trial. This ruling, in my humble opinion, balances the rights of journos and the offended parties.

THE ONE-YEAR PRESCRIPTION PROTECTS JOURNALISTS because it mitigates the “chilling effect” of protracted legal uncertainty. Absent such a limit, every critical cyber publication would expose its author to 15 years of possible criminal prosecution and harassment. That is too long for daily grinders such as reporters, columnists, editors, and online podcasters.

Since I started writing opinions after I retired from the Supreme Court almost two decades ago, I have tried to protect journos. For example, my Feb. 24, 2019 piece (“Is Maria Ressa liable for libel?”) explored the defenses available in the cyberlibel case filed against Maria Ressa and Reynaldo Santos Jr. arising from a republished article. There, I discussed the advantages of invoking prescription as a defense. (See also “Cyberlibel and Maria Ressa,” 6/21/20).

Clearly, today, cyberlibel cases filed beyond the one-year prescription reckoned from their discovery would result in an acquittal. To repeat, this shortened period accords protection to journalists and publicists.

ON THE OTHER HAND, THE “DISCOVERY RULE” PROTECTS THE PUBLIC. By reckoning the one-year period from the time of discovery, rather than the date of publication, the Court acknowledged the unique nature of online libel. Social media like Facebook, LinkedIn, and Instagram have privacy features that limit their public exposure.

Thus, Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College (Sept. 29, 2014, per J Presbitero J. Velasco Jr., Third Division) recognized that social media users can control the visibility of their posts through privacy settings. To presume that a certain online post is readily discoverable by the offended party would be, in the Court’s language, a “grave legal error.”

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The discovery rule obviously preserves the public right to seek redress where the harm is not readily discoverable, thereby offering a reasonable period for the offended party to seek redress.

Speech in cyberspace is not without protection. Neither is it without consequence. Though the law should keep pace with the velocity of digital speech, the Court en banc’s ruling is a balanced guardrail in tempering the boundlessness of online expression.

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