Stranglehold

I was reading the distinguished academic Mark Thompson’s interesting analysis, “Marcos Jr.’s grip on the Philippine presidency loosens,” online at the East Asia Forum, when news came that Sen. Vicente Sotto III’s Senate presidency had survived a plot to substitute him with Sen. Loren Legarda. Since one of the two outsiders (meaning nonsenators) called in to help save his Senate presidency, supposedly including President Marcos, it made me think about Thompson’s reading of the situation and his assumptions about the political circus.

Thompson’s assumptions include, first, that his “biggest political miscalculation” was handing over his predecessor to the International Criminal Court; second, that Vice President Sara Duterte “fought the pro-administration bloc to a standoff” in the senatorial midterms; and third, that the antidynasty bill and the appointment of Jesus Crispin Remulla as Ombudsman “would only further entrench the country’s powerful dynasties” and make “any containment of the Dutertes … against Marcos unlikely.” In sum, per Thompson, “Marcos’ promises to uphold civil liberties and improve government accountability appear to hold limited discursive power against resurgent illiberal populism, fueled by grievance and the allure of punitive leadership.”

To make short shrift of the assumptions above: first, handing over the ex-president wasn’t so much a miscalculation as it was a colossal gamble, not least because it was not fully sought by the President. Second, the Veep was able to fight the administration to a standoff in the midterms, but it could have been a KO, but wasn’t, because the other half of the remaining Senate was majority administration, and because the bench of the VP-led opposition was too narrow to put up a formidable slate in the first place, a deficiency it still has. Third, much as the (Ilocos Norte Rep. Sandro) Marcos-sponsored antidynasty bill is laughable to the serious, it is quite possibly serious enough for most voters who happen to think the problem is with dynasties outside their home districts, if the surveys are to be believed.

Related to this, even a half-vigorous Ombudsman can cause a lot of grief compared to the see-say-hear-nothing Ombudsman of the Duterte years. And any way you slice and dice the electoral map, under the leadership of the Veep, the shock and awe of the Duterte phenomenon has retreated to its regional bailiwick in Mindanao and ethnic enclave in Cebuano-speaking areas, while retreating from what had made its upset victory in 2016 possible: dominating Luzon where the fabled Lingayen-Lucena Corridor alone equals the votes of the Visayas and Mindanao combined.

Faced with a raw deal—ending up in the dock—senators tried to mount a coup to save themselves and benefit potential coalition partners in the effort by dangling other benefits, such as circling the wagons to protect the Veep should she face a second impeachment. That they failed–not least because some senators may have prudently decided that protecting some of their own from going to jail might weigh heavily on their political futures—suggests things are pretty nerve-wracking for the Dutertes and their friends.

Even when affection for the ex-president might have inspired opposition to the old man’s ending up in The Hague, the Dutertes were reminded of a reality they have been unable to change. Their popularity can be harnessed at the polls (but in diminishing quantities of votes), but never in the streets, which is where political popularity is made manifest between elections and surveys. The Veep might have been saved by a Supreme Court sympathetic to her plight because too many nonlawyers and worse, politicians, seem to harbor the sacrilegious thought that justices are not only accountable, but impeachable, mortals. But the saving has antagonized not just politicians but also lawyers and civil society, and impeachment remains a possibility.

So how can the President’s grip be loosening? The hierarchy won’t withdraw the mandate of heaven; the military remains in the barracks, and the Duterte bloc’s Chinese affections invite military loathing; his grip on Congress—both chambers—continues; the economy is anemic, but no sector seems interested in making it flatline due to regime change.

The President still has five months for the Ombudsman to file charges, which could conceivably restore his ratings: he can brag about it in July in his State of the Nation Address (Sona). And a year until his swan song, Sona in 2027, when he is expected to find someone, anyone, to anoint and put up a fight against–well, that’s the same time frame for an impeachment to play itself out. If not, he has two years to announce a constitutional convention with a plebiscite so a new government can be elected in 2028. His successor can be elected to hold a purely ceremonial office.