When dev’t serves power, not the public
The Philippines’ continuing struggle to improve the quality of life of its people is often explained through familiar and convenient narratives: geography, colonial history, rapid population growth, weak discipline, or cultural attitudes. These explanations are not entirely wrong, but they consistently miss the central issue. The country’s most persistent failures are not accidental or inevitable. They are the predictable outcomes of a system where corruption has become the organizing principle of governance.
Corruption in the Philippines is not merely about stolen public funds or headline-grabbing scandals. It is embedded in how decisions are made, how priorities are set, and how responsibility is avoided. Development does not simply fail despite corruption. In many cases, development is designed in ways that allow corruption to persist without destabilizing those in power. The state appears active, planning, spending, and inaugurating, but outcomes remain fragile, reversible, and uneven.
What is often missed in discussions of corruption is how completely it structures everyday life. Corruption is not only a governance problem. It is a quality-of-life problem. Unsafe roads and deadly accidents are the result of substandard construction and lax enforcement of laws. Chronic illness, stress, and poor lifestyle outcomes follow from weak public health systems and polluted environments. Crime flourishes where impunity is normalized and justice is negotiable. Disasters become mass tragedies when early warnings, infrastructure standards, and emergency responses are compromised. Even the country’s persistent brain drain is not simply about higher salaries abroad. It is a rational escape from a system that rewards connections over competence. These are not separate crises. They are downstream effects of a single governing failure.
Consider flood control, one of the most visible and deadly examples. After every major typhoon, rivers overflow, communities are submerged, and lives are lost. Investigations follow, often revealing poorly built embankments, questionable contractors, and bloated project costs. The following year, new funds are allocated, frequently larger than before, to rebuild the same structures, often through the same networks. The cycle repeats. What should be a long-term public safety investment becomes a recurring source of political and economic extraction. In this system, failure does not trigger reform. It justifies renewed spending.
The same logic appears in education. Classrooms remain overcrowded despite rising budgets. Schools are built without enough teachers. Teachers are hired without sustained training. Learning materials are procured without regard to actual classroom needs. Reports are submitted, targets are nominally met, and funds are fully utilized, yet functional literacy remains low.
The consequences of this pattern are measurable and cumulative. Preventable illnesses go untreated, shortening life expectancy. Weak schooling limits productivity and social mobility. Substandard infrastructure magnifies disaster risk and economic loss. Environmental degradation worsens because enforcement is selective and penalties are negotiable. Poverty persists not because resources are absent, but because they are diverted, diluted, or delayed at every stage of delivery.
Over time, corruption functions as an informal political employment system. Development funds create jobs not only through legitimate labor, but through networks of contractors, brokers, fixers, and intermediaries who depend on discretionary spending. Loyalty is rewarded with access. Silence is rewarded with protection.
This is why corruption in the Philippines cannot be addressed through moral appeals or transparency alone. The country has no shortage of laws, oversight bodies, or reform rhetoric. What it lacks is credible, consistent enforcement, especially when violations involve political dynasties, powerful contractors, or well-connected officials. Accountability exists, but it is selective. It is applied unevenly, delayed strategically, and softened through negotiation.
Yet the central obstacle remains political. Corruption persists because it benefits those with the power to reform it. Dynastic politics, weak party systems, and patronage-based governance ensure that development spending doubles as political capital.
The real question, then, is not whether corruption can be reduced. It is whether Filipinos will continue to accept a version of development that serves power efficiently, speaks fluently about reform, and spends generously, while quietly withholding safety, dignity, and opportunity from the public it claims to serve.
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Allen Espinosa is a professor of science education at the college of advanced studies and a research fellow at the educational policy research and development office of the Philippine Normal University. You may reach him though espinosa.aa@pnu.edu.ph. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the PNU.
