Who we are since 2025
Just recently, Dean Dulay and Cleve Arguelles came out with a paper titled “The Contemporary Filipino Voter: Factionalism, Demographics, and Vote Choice” in the Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs. Their study included a fascinating table which gives us a snapshot of where we were, as voters, at least as of the time the survey used by the authors took place, which was in the aftermath of the Marcos midterms last year.
At the time, my view was that it was an election that was the Dutertes to lose: they had public opinion behind them, while the administration had little to show for itself. The Dutertes lost it because at the end of the day, the Marcoses were old pros while the Dutertes were national neophytes. The Marcoses simply had a more experienced—and electable—slate, while the Dutertes, for all they enjoyed in terms of political momentum, had a basket case of a slate; the center-left opposition made a startling comeback because of its two most viable candidates: one (Sen. Francis Pangilinan) marshaled the old and new faithful, while the other (Sen. Bam Aquino) applied tried-and-tested old political logic: cobbling a coalition of local and national bigwigs able to commit to delivering votes.
The political momentum shifted to the Marcoses regardless of whether President Marcos’ popularity was up or down, though it has slowly improved; the Dutertes have thrown up creative roadblocks, but lack the stamina and resources to mount an effective resistance; the center-left holds the balance of power.
Here’s the snapshot the authors used in their paper: two WR Numero surveys in the first and last weeks of April 2025. Overall, here’s how to slice and dice us, the people: 37.8 percent, Duterte; 26.4 percent, opposition (meaning center-left); 21.2 percent, none of the above; and 14.5 percent, Marcos. For the regions, we read the percentages in terms of their affiliations. Meaning, for Metro Manila, for example, 25.8 percent of Marcos supporters are here, 13.5 percent of the opposition’s supporters are here, 12.9 percent of the none of the above are from here, while 8.1 percent of Duterte supporters are here. Rest of Luzon: 58 percent of Marcos, 56.8 percent of the none of the above, 41.2 percent of the opposition, and 37.1 percent of Duterte supporters. In the Visayas: 37.9 percent of the opposition is here, 14.3 percent of the Duterte, 9.8 percent of the Marcos, and 9.5 percent of the none of the above are there; in Mindanao: 40.5 percent of Duterte, 20.7 percent of the none of the above, 7.3 percent of the opposition, and 5.3 percent of the Marcos are there.
Class ABC has 20.5 percent of the Marcos, 8.9 percent of the none of the above, 8 percent of the opposition, and 5.7 percent of the Duterte; Class D (the biggest class): 21.2 percent of the Duterte, 19.8 percent of the opposition, 16.1 percent of the none of the above, and 15.5 percent of the Marcos; Class E (poorest of the poor): 75 percent of the none of the above, 73.1 percent of the Duterte, 72.2 percent of the opposition, and 64 percent of the Marcos are from here. 30 and Below: 47 percent of the Duterte, 33.5 percent of the opposition, 31.1 percent of the none of the above, 21.8 percent of the Marcos; 31 to 59 (next biggest): 55.2 percent of the opposition, 52.6 percent of the none of the above, 51.3 percent of the Marcos and 45 percent of the Duterte. Finally, rural: 69.6 percent of the opposition, 59 percent of the Duterte, 53.6 percent of the none of the above, 43.5 percent of the Marcos; urban: 56.5 percent of the Marcos, 46.4 percent of the none of the above, 41 percent of the Duterte, and 30.4 percent of the opposition.
Among the paper’s conclusions: Self-identified ideology offers surprisingly little explanatory power. A commanding 57.5 percent of Filipinos place themselves in the center, dwarfing the combined left- and right-wing identifiers at just 16.9 percent. All three major factions—Marcos, Duterte, and the opposition—display nearly identical distributions across the ideological spectrum. Left-right labels, at least as conventionally understood, do not meaningfully distinguish these groups.
On issues, clear differences emerge along social rather than economic lines. Opposition supporters adopt more liberal positions on social questions (e.g., divorce, death penalty), while Marcos and Duterte supporters are often statistically indistinguishable from each other. On economic matters such as income tax redistribution or free tuition, the three groups show no significant divergence. This pattern lends weight to interpretations stressing personalistic, kinship, or ethnic-regional ties over programmatic or ideological drivers for both Marcos and Duterte voters.
Finally, the factions behave differently when it comes to translating endorsements into votes for senators. Regression analysis reveals that Marcos supporters were no more likely than Duterte or opposition voters to back Marcos-endorsed candidates like Senators Erwin Tulfo and Panfilo Lacson. Opposition voters showed strong loyalty to Aquino and Pangilinan. Duterte’s endorsements of Senators Bong Go and Ronald “Bato” dela Rosa boosted support among his own base but depressed it among both Marcos and opposition voters—evidence of a polarizing effect. Yet that polarization appears net positive for Duterte-aligned candidates’ overall electoral prospects.
In short, the data paints a picture of a fragmented electorate where regional loyalties and personal brands matter far more than ideology or economics, with Duterte’s coalition retaining the broadest mobilization potential even as Marcos support remains relatively narrow.
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Email: mlquezon3@gmail.com; Twitter: @mlq3
