What if VP Sara resigns?

It’s a question that’s been floated since very early on, when the impeachment complaint was still in the House of Representatives. It’s a suspicion that’s been in the minds of those who are concerned that Vice President Sara Duterte may just resign as a way of avoiding the consequences of impeachment, which include disqualification from running in the 2028 presidential election. If it happens, the fear is that it may render useless all the efforts of the Senate and the House. As the impeachment trial runs its course, the feared hypothetical scenario may turn into reality if VP Sara senses that the impending decision will be one of conviction.

For those who cry foul over the prospect of VP Sara’s disqualification from running for president in 2028, the answer lies in the Philippine Constitution itself [Article XI (7)]. In impeachment proceedings, our Constitution commands the Senate to find out whether a public official committed any one of these impeachable offenses: 1. culpable violation of the Constitution, 2. treason, 3. bribery, 4. graft and corruption, 5. other high crimes, or 6. betrayal of public trust.

If, after trial, the Senate finds that a public official is guilty of having committed at least one of the above impeachable offenses, the Senate must impose not just one but two mandatory penalties. These penalties are: first, removal from the public office the accused currently occupies (the vice presidency for VP Sara); second, permanent disqualification from holding any public office (from barangay kagawad to president and any appointed public post).

But what if VP Sara resigns before the impeachment court can decide? Will the case become a useless exercise because she no longer occupies a public post from which she could be removed?

When the impeachment complaint was filed in the Senate, the obligation of the Senate to hear and decide the issue of whether VP Sara committed any impeachable offense got locked in. In lawyer-speak, the Senate, as an impeachment court, became vested with jurisdiction, as a consequence of which it had the duty to decide.

If she resigns before the Senate can render its decision, the first issue of whether she should be removed from office will indeed become moot and academic. It will be a futile exercise for the Senate to still render a decision declaring that VP Sara deserves to be removed from office because she no longer occupies the subject office. Her resignation, however, will not render moot the second issue of whether she should be disqualified from occupying any public post because this issue is not dependent on her continuing occupancy of the vice presidency.

The issue of whether VP Sara can be penalized with dismissal from the vice presidency is dependent on two facts: first, VP Sara’s occupancy of the vice presidency, and second, her commission of an impeachable offense. In contrast, the issue of whether VP Sara can be penalized with permanent disqualification from holding any public office is dependent only on one fact: commission of an impeachable offense. The penalty of permanent disqualification from public office is purely dependent on the personal character of VP Sara as revealed by her commission of an impeachable offense.

What will be merely erased by VP Sara’s resignation is the fact of her incumbency as vice president. Her resignation will not erase the fact that she may have committed an impeachable offense. Her resignation does not erase the question of whether she is already disqualified from occupying any public post in the future. Her resignation will not divest the impeachment court of jurisdiction to continue deciding the case.

Even if VP Sara resigns, the Senate is still duty bound to continue deciding the case because it is the only tribunal vested by the Constitution with the exclusive power to impose a sui generis penalty of permanent disqualification from public office. Our criminal courts have the power to impose the accessory penalty of perpetual and absolute disqualification from public office against any public official convicted of a crime, but the said penalty can be erased by the president through executive clemency, even if the penalty is imposed by the Supreme Court. In contrast, a penalty of perpetual disqualification imposed by an impeachment court is beyond the clemency powers of the president to erase.

The resignation by a public official is not an exempting circumstance from any liability. A public official cannot avoid criminal liability and the consequent penalty of imprisonment by merely resigning. A public official cannot avoid administrative liability and the penalty of forfeiture of retirement benefits by merely resigning. A public official cannot avoid civil liability and the payment of damages by merely resigning. A public official cannot avoid liability for an impeachable offense and the resulting penalty of permanent disqualification from any public office by merely resigning.

If VP Sara resigns, it will still be the constitutional duty of the Senate to find out if, by her personal character as revealed by her commission of an impeachable offense, she is permanently unfit to hold any public office.

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