A very strange impeachment (2)

Our inheritance of impeachment also includes unwritten assumptions from organic evolution and common sense. In the United States, only specific officers preside: chief justice (for presidents), Senate president (vice president), or Senate president pro tempore. No ifs or buts—it’s plain logic.

Charters specify offenses like treason and bribery but use the catch-all “other high crimes,” knowing no such precise legal term exists. The purpose is to cover behavior making someone unfit, per the consensus of representatives.

Borrowed institutions evolve to become our own. We expanded impeachable offenses: “graft and corruption” (1973) and “betrayal of public trust” (1987). Early Philippine impeachment (1935–1985) was a near-impossible last resort; framers made it somewhat easier.

We adapted borrowed ideas: a stronger Filipino presidency, separately elected vice president, hybrid Commission on Appointments, and a powerful post-1987 judiciary. Similarly, we adapted impeachment and must stay conscious of its purpose.

Three foundations stand out: (1) an instrument of last resort for serious, intractable problems; (2) a collective process by nonlawyers with appropriate character—House prosecutes as people’s voice; Senate acts as jury of peers for high officials; and (3) resolves continued fitness for office, not criminal guilt. Only office is at stake, so nonlawyers suffice. Actual crimes require separate judicial trials with penalties; impeachment removes you from the job.

Over time, we shifted from a jury of peers toward a Gallo-Roman tribunal of judges. This led to full-fledged judicial trials—never the American or our framers’ intent since 1935.

This is the most lawyerly-infested impeachment yet—undemocratic, unproductive, and demeaning. Lawyers create an impression of a judicial trial without truly conducting one, playing to the public gallery (which is proper, as the public judges too).

The defense rightly invoked Vice President Sara Duterte’s electoral mandate—it underscores the seriousness of cutting short a people’s mandate. Impeachment demands sobriety; it cannot be whim or vendetta, only for continuing harm or proven unfitness.

Yet anchoring the defense on lawyerly standards is a mistake. Defendants need able advocates who understand the political arena, not just rule magicians. Estelito Mendoza dazzled in former President Joseph Estrada’s case but lost the public. Joker Arroyo’s simple line—”we cannot have a nation run by a thief”—prevailed. Current defense lacks gravitas or eloquence.

House managers excel by blending legal skill with political communication. Figures like Hilario G. Davide Jr. and Juan Ponce Enrile succeeded through political instincts. Amando Virgil Ligutan practiced law “in the grand manner”—using procedure to reach truth, distinguishing court from impeachment.

Even the public risks over-legalizing. Ligutan clarified: actions may not prove crimes but may demonstrate unfit behavior for high office. Senators must weigh this.

Objections to co-presiding officers and “senator-judges” stand: the latter exalts lawyers and pressures nonlawyers. Senators are tired of pretending to run a formal trial. Estrada’s warning endures: win legal skirmishes but lose the larger political battle.

Sen. Risa Hontiveros noted that past impeachments allowed more senatorial questioning. Greater flexibility, recalibration, and independence from court rules would serve well. Senators should flex their role as peers judging fitness, not pretend judges.

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