When three world powers meet
At the recent Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Leaders Meeting in Shenzhen, China, the historic meeting of United States President Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and Russian President Vladimir Putin became the focus of media attention. The key question was: What did they talk about?
We can’t be sure what they actually discussed. But the four-point declaration they issued afterward is intriguing enough, both for what was addressed and what was left unmentioned. The declaration called for reforming the United Nations; increasing the production and supply of refined petroleum products; respecting state consent and the immunities of state officials, while declaring that the International Criminal Court (ICC) and similar bodies “must not abuse their jurisdiction”; and reducing nuclear risks and preventing nuclear proliferation.
For a document titled “Declaration toward Peace,” it is interesting that no reference is made to the Russia-Ukraine war, the US-Israeli war on Iran, or Israel’s war against the Palestinian people. Neither is there any mention of the growing tensions in the South China Sea.
More to the point, at least for small nations like us, these great powers recognize the need for global coordination in managing certain risks, even as they resist forms of international authority that could constrain their own political power. None of the three countries is a party to the Rome Statute establishing the ICC. Yet their combined influence could affect the willingness of other states to cooperate with the court.
State consent is already recognized under the Rome Statute, although the court may exercise jurisdiction over nationals of nonmember states in certain circumstances. What the statute explicitly rejects is the claim that official position exempts state officials from criminal responsibility before the ICC.
The implications for the Philippines go beyond former President Rodrigo Duterte’s upcoming ICC trial. Our country is a relatively small state operating where the strategic interests of China and the US intersect. For nations like us, international law offers a means of asserting claims that cannot be secured through superior military or economic power.
The 2016 South China Sea arbitration is a case in point. The award did not compel Chinese compliance, but it provided a continuing legal reference point for Philippine diplomacy. The ICC is a different kind of court. Yet both raise the same issue: To what extent can legal decisions constrain powerful political actors?
If international institutions become increasingly dependent on understandings among major powers, smaller states may find themselves relying more on alliances and strategic accommodations than on international legal rules.
It’s one thing to warn the ICC against abusing its jurisdiction, but another to undermine its ability to function. The US has never joined the court. On Feb. 6, 2025, Trump authorized sanctions against individuals involved in certain ICC investigations and prosecutions. His administration subsequently extended these sanctions to more court officials and, in October, to the institution itself. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has even threatened to dismantle the ICC “brick by brick” if necessary.
What is interesting is how other countries are responding to this exercise of American power. Japan, the ICC’s largest financial contributor, has expressed concern over sanctions against court officials, including its president, Judge Tomoko Akane, a Japanese national. Instead of bowing to Washington’s position, Japan has reaffirmed its support and is reportedly considering advancing its contributions to help the court through this difficult period.
In October this year, the foreign ministers of Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom jointly reaffirmed their support for the ICC’s independence. All have substantial security relationships with the US. Yet they have publicly disagreed with Washington’s measures against the court.
Japan’s position is particularly ironic. Defeated and occupied by the US after World War II, its wartime leaders were tried before the Tokyo war crimes tribunal. That tribunal, alongside Nuremberg, helped lay the groundwork for the international criminal justice system from which the ICC emerged. Today, while it remains heavily dependent on American security guarantees, Japan is among the strongest defenders of the ICC.
This is fascinating. It suggests that international institutions, once established, can rely on the support of countries whose commitments are not entirely dependent on the great powers that helped shape the postwar order.
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