Stop distorting the definition of force majeure

The current debate regarding the expansion of the Senate’s remote session rules deserves a closer look, particularly concerning the legal definition of force majeure. Under both the Civil Code and existing Senate rules, force majeure requires an event that makes physical attendance impossible, not merely inconvenient or politically difficult. If the Senate lowers that threshold to “justifiable condition” or “threats,” it risks replacing a clear legal standard with one vulnerable to subjective interpretation.

The Senate’s own rules, specifically Section XIV, Rule 41 (b), mirror this legal standard. The rule states that “The Senate President may convene and hold the session through teleconference, video conference, or other reliable forms of remote or electronic means, using appropriate information and communications technology systems, due to force majeure or the occurrence of a national emergency as determined by the majority of all the members of the Senate which may prevent the convening of the Senate or the physical presence of its members.”

When proponents of the rule change cite wars in the Middle East or tensions in the Taiwan Strait as justifications, they ignore the fact that these international events do not pose a physical barrier to our lawmakers. They create global instability, certainly, but they do not lock the doors of the Senate.

We must ask why this specific interpretation is being pushed now. Critics, including former senators, have rightly pointed out that the definition of force majeure is being stretched to accommodate individual circumstances— namely, the legal troubles of specific members—rather than genuine, collective exigencies.

Trying to shoehorn personal legal risks into the category of force majeure is a dangerous precedent. If we redefine a legal term to cover an individual’s desire to avoid physical attendance for personal reasons, we effectively abandon the integrity of the institution’s rules.

Legal definitions exist for a reason. They provide boundaries that prevent subjective or self-serving applications of the law. If force majeure can mean whatever a legislator wants it to mean to avoid their duties, the rule becomes meaningless.

The integrity of our legislative process relies on the presence of our representatives. By distorting the definition of force majeure, we risk turning a vital constitutional exception into a convenient loophole that undermines the public’s trust in our democratic institutions.

REGINALD B. TAMAYO,
Marikina City